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Abstract 
 
This paper explores overlooked dynamics relevant to the criminalisation and 
securitisation of migration, with Greece serving as a case-study. Reminiscent of 
an heroic episode in ancient Greek history, where Leonidas and the Spartans 
willingly stood to their inevitable death against the mass Persian army, about 300 
irregular migrants engaged in a 44-day hunger strike in January 2011, achieving 
some concessions from the state. The paper draws on a set of face-to-face 
interviews with these migrant protesters, complemented by discourse analysis. 
Its aims are twofold: firstly, to analyse the impact of securitisation and of the 
economic downturn on the migrant experience; and secondly, to explore the 
migrants’ attempt to resist and react to their criminalisation through organised 
protest action.  
The first section sets the stage for the analysis by looking at the national context 
and migration patterns. The second section discusses the migrants’ own 
evaluations of their lived experiences and mobilisation. The third section then 
reflects on the discursive strategies that migrant protesters themselves employed 
to influence migration discourse and policy. The analysis demonstrates that the 
prevalence of restrictive frames and policies on migration, predictably, increase 
migrant insecurity, abuse and deprivation. Nevertheless, irregular migrants are 
able and willing to escape their invisibility, even temporarily, by challenging 
established frames, making strategic alliances and engaging in highly political, 
rational and ideologically defined protest action.   
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Introduction 
 
It has become commonplace to argue that questions about migration provoke – almost 
inherently and typically exaggerated – anxieties about its impact on host societies. The 
trend is for citizens in the Western world to perceive migrants predominantly as a threat to 
the economy, to a particular way of life, and not least, to public order, among others. 
Receiving states, on their part, have adopted immigration laws and policies that are 
designed to restrict flows of, primarily but not exclusively, irregular migrants. These include 
measures to reinforce borders, proliferate criminal sanctions for migration offences, 
facilitate detention and deportation processes, and tighten conditions of entry and stay 
(Parkin, 2013). This phenomenon of conflating migration, crime and security, observed at 
both public attitudinal surveys and state policies is at the heart of the interrelated process of 
‘criminalisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of migration. 
 
A plethora of studies in the literature seek to analyse the discursive process through which 
the migrant-criminal thesis is constructed. Among others, they identify political and media 
discourses (Buonfino, 2004), security practices (Basaran, 2008), institutional configurations 
(Karyotis, 2007) and forms of governmentality (Bigo, 2002) as playing a crucial role in the 
top-down framing of migration as a menace. What these emphatically highlight is that 
securitisation occurs as a result of a process wherein elites and publics, in a given context 
and within specific structures, reach a shared understanding that migrants are inferior 
and/or threatening, which is irrespective of any “objective measurements of how dangerous 
they ‘really’ are” (Waever 1996:106). In fact, securitisation is not only found to be counter-
productive to migration management and detrimental to migrant human rights (Guild, 2010) 
but is also, counter-intuitively, unrelated to increases in either crime rates or immigration 
flows (Palidda, 2011). Instead, it is periods of socio-political instability and economic 
downturn that produce the greatest supply (in the form of hostile elite discourses) and 
demand (in the form of rising public threat perceptions) for intensified criminal-migrant 
frames (Melossi, 2003). 
 
While both the process and implications of securitisation continue to inspire heated 
academic debates that cross disciplinary and theoretical divides, how migrants themselves 
experience and react to it remains poorly understood. The scarcity of empirical data, such 
as surveys that would shed light on the migrant experience and attitudes is partly to blame 
for this relative imbalance in the literature. A more underlying reason, arguably, derives 
from the way that securitisation itself is conceived. The emphasis tends to be on the 
interplay between three types of actors: ‘securitising actors’, commonly political and 
security elites who portray migration as a threat, ‘facilitating actors’, such as the media, who 
popularise the threat image by reproducing the official discourse, and an empowering 
audience, such as the citizens within a state, who evaluate these cues against competing 
representations, and, accordingly, develop positive or negative attitudes towards migration 
(Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1997). Migrants themselves, on the other hand, are often 
ignored because they are seen as the passive protagonists and subjects of securitisation, 
who lack agency and a voice to impact upon how migration is framed and managed. 
 
Greece offers an ideal setting to explore overseen dynamics relevant to the securitisation of 
migration. It is a country with persistently high anti-immigration attitudes since the 
unexpected inflow of migrants in the early 1990s, undergoing a severe economic crisis 
since 2010 and having to rely on external rescue packages to prevent involuntary default 
on its debt. Drawing on discourse analysis and a set of face-to-face interviews with 
migrants that staged a 44-day hunger strike in January 2011, the aim of this paper is 
twofold: firstly, to analyse the impact of securitisation and of the economic downturn on the 
migrant experience; and secondly, to explore the migrants’ attempt to resist and react to 
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their criminalisation through organised protest action. The first section sets the stage for the 
analysis by looking at the national context and migration patterns. The second section 
discusses the migrants’ own evaluations of their lived experiences and mobilisation. The 
third section then reflects on the discursive strategies that migrant protesters themselves 
employed to influence migration discourse and policy. 
  
 
The Securitisation of Migration in Greece 
 
The tectonic geopolitical shifts with the end of the Cold War transformed Greece from an 
emigration into a de facto immigration country.  An estimated one million irregular 
migrants1, mainly from Albania (about 65%), the Balkans and Eastern Europe, arrived in 
the 1990s in a country with a population of about eleven million citizens (Karyotis, 2012). 
While for those migrants Greece was the final destination, a second wave, with different 
characteristics followed with the turn of the millennium. Migrants mainly from Asia and 
Africa arrived irregularly, seeking to use Greece as a transit to other Western European 
countries. However, due to the Dublin II regulation and the intensification of internal 
European Union (EU) border controls (e.g. FRONTEX), they became trapped in Greece. 
 
This sudden influx activated a defence mechanism on the part of the state, with political 
elites, security professionals, and the mass media, all contributing to the discursive 
securitisation of migration (Karyotis, 2012; Swarts & Karakatsanis, 2012; Karyotis & 
Skleparis, 2013). The discourse of political elites in particular emphasised the need to 
fortify the borders, protect national identity and curtail the development of socio-economic 
threats that migrants were deemed responsible for, such as an alleged increase in crime 
rates, although there was little objective evidence in support of these claims (Karydis, 1996; 
Antonopoulos, 2005; Antonopoulos, Tierney, & Webster, 2008). 
 
Law and migration policy, equally, projected the message that migration is a threat that has 
to be curtailed. The country’s first immigration Law introduced in 1991, as well as 
subsequent amendments to its legal framework were driven entirely by security 
considerations and were designed to prevent the entry and stay of migrants. For instance, 
Law 1975/1991 adopted very narrow definitions of asylum and family reunification, 
excluded irregular migrants from welfare services including health care (except in 
emergency cases) and education, and criminalised any form of solidarity from the private 
sector, such as access to housing, public transport and employment (Karyotis 2012). In the 
absence of any provisions for integration and with effectively all routes to regular 
immigration sealed off, the emphasis of the authorities was on hardening and militarising 
the external border, through, for example, the establishment of new border guard forces in 
1998 and later the construction of a 10.5 kilometres fence across its northern border with 
Turkey in 2012 (Karyotis & Skleparis, 2013).  
 
With limited opposition to the dominant securitised frame on migration, it is not surprising 
that a ubiquitous moral panic ensued (Antonopoulos, 2005: 251). One of the most 
persistent causes of public insecurity was the perception that migration is linked to 
criminality. For instance, 84% of citizens in 1993 felt that migrants pose a public order 
threat (Kiprianos, Balias & Passas 2003: 154), a view shared with an overwhelming 92% of 
police officers, who in a 2006 survey thought migrants were partly or exclusively 
                                               
1
 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the term ‘irregular’ migrants, is 
preferable to ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’, which have negative connotations. ‘Irregular’ migrants, include all those 
who arrive in a country without required papers, including asylum seekers. Even if their citizenship status may 
result in their arrest while their claims are processed, their detention is administrative, not criminal. 
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responsible for the perceived increase in criminality (Antonopoulos, Tierney, & Webster, 
2008: 372). What is perhaps paradoxical is that despite these collective public anxieties 
towards migrants, most Greeks reported that they had not been personally affected by their 
presence and had often developed friendship ties with them (Kasimis, Papadopoulos &  
Zacopoulou 2003). 
 
Accelerated economic growth and recognition that the overall economic impact of migrants 
– including of irregular ones – was positive, facilitated some tentative moves towards 
liberalising policy in the eve of the new millennium. Even so, the adoption of a series of 
one-off regularisation programs (in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2007), granting amnesty to 
categories of settled migrants lacked a long-term perspective, while the 2005 Action Plan 
for the social integration of immigrants (Law 3386/2005) was not really implemented in 
practice (Triandafyllidou et al, 2013: 23). The onset of the Great Recession since 2007 and 
the subsequent severe Greek debt crisis of 2010 put an abrupt end to any hesitant moves 
towards liberalisation. The state, at both discursive and policy levels, retreated to a harder 
stance on immigration, while public anti-immigration attitudes and support for far-right 
parties reached new heights (Karyotis & Skleparis, 2013). 
 
Immigration emerged as one of the most salient issues, alongside the austerity debate, in 
the run up and aftermath of the 2012 Parliamentary elections. Surveys of Greek Members 
of Parliament and their voters revealed that all parties, with the exception of the radical left 
SYRIZA exhibited varying degrees of anti-immigration bias (Karyotis, Rudig & Judge, 
2014). More tellingly, even SYRIZA voters did not connect with their party on this issue and 
instead perceived migration as a threat. What this might point towards is that conditions of 
economic crisis compress the space for political alternatives and provide fertile ground for 
intolerance. Tensions between migrants and citizens in Greece did indeed intensify, 
resulting in social segregation, vigilantism against migrants and racial violence. For 
instance, the ‘Network for the Recording of Incidents of Racist Violence’ identified a 20% 
increase in incidents of racist violence in 2012, compared to 2011 (Karyotis & Skleparis, 
2013). 
 
The picture that emerges is that Greek migration management is characterised by short-
termism, knee-jerk reactions and incoherent policies, indicative of its inability to shake off 
the established frame that, fundamentally, migration remains ‘an unwanted burden for the 
country’ (Triandafyllidou, 2009: 174). The securitisation of migration also has 
unquestionably detrimental impact on the human rights of migrants, with arbitrary 
discrimination based on ethnic and racial characteristics, inhumane conditions in detention 
centres and even threats of physical violence described by Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) as routine (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
 
Against this backdrop, about 300 immigrants residing irregularly in Crete, travelled to 
Athens and Thessaloniki in January 2011 and commenced a hunger strike, which lasted for 
44 days. Supported by solidarity groups and NGOs, the hunger strikers put their lives at 
risk but achieved some concessions from the state with regards to their legal status. Their 
number, 300, is reminiscent of a heroic episode in ancient Greek history, where Leonidas 
and the Spartans willingly stood to their inevitable death against the mass Persian army in 
pursuit of higher objectives (Walsh & Tsilimpounidi 2012). The difference, however, is that 
while the Spartans’ sacrifice is glorified and celebrated, the migrants’ battle soon faded into 
obscurity, after a short period of visibility. Drawing on a set of face-to-face interviews with 
these migrant protesters, the next section discusses their profile and motivations, and 
assesses their own evaluations of their protest action and of the impact of criminalisation 
on their lives. 
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Profile and Lived Experiences of the Hunger Strikers 
 
The above section contextualised the two-decade long process of securitisation of 
migration in Greece. The analysis indicates that this has been driven by elite discourse and 
state policies and negotiated with citizens, who experienced a heightened sense of anxiety 
towards ‘the other’. The main opposition to this has come from civil society groups, such as 
the Human Rights Watch and intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with some moderate successes, including the 
clearance of anti-personnel mines Greece held across its northern border until 2009 
(Karyotis & Skleparis, 2013). Migrants themselves had scarce, if any, opportunities to make 
any impact on immigration discourse or policy.  
 
This changed somewhat with the debt crisis that exploded in Greece in 2010. Not only did it 
have a tremendously negative effect on economic conditions but also provoked 
unprecedented levels of anti-austerity protest (Rudig & Karyotis, 2014). In such a climate of 
intense general mobilisation and rising economic deprivation, migrant activists found fertile 
ground to attempt to make their own grievances heard. Drawing on the experience of 
previous sporadic and fragmented migrant marches, and motivated by the worsening socio-
economic conditions, a migrant movement with a more coherent basis started to emerge. 
 
Instrumental to this was the support from social networks and NGOs. Members of the 
‘Migrants’ Forum in Crete’, a local NGO, proposed a hunger strike, originally pencilled for 
November 2010, when a new restrictive immigration law was being pushed through 
Parliament. Participants residing in Crete irregularly were recruited by volunteers on a door-
to-door basis and a decision was reached to host the hunger strike simultaneously in the 
two major cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. With support from other local sympathisers, the 
protesters travelled by boat and occupied symbolic public spaces, commencing the strike 
on 25 January 2011. In total, 287 people took part, following a few last-minute withdrawals, 
237 of them in an unused building of the Athens Law School and a further 50 in the Labour 
Centre in Thessaloniki. 
 
The hunger strike, a form of activism that in Greece and Europe falls outside the normal 
‘protest repertoires’ (Tilly, 1995: 26), captured media and public attention and provoked 
passionate reactions of sympathy/condemnation. Support came from migrant groups and 
networks, NGOs, antiracist and university student bodies, labour associations, 
neighbourhood initiatives, anarchist collectives, and left-wing political parties. Some of 
these joined forces to create the ‘Initiative for Solidarity’, which, among others, organised 
demonstrations in support of the hunger strikers. The protesters themselves formed their 
own collective body, the ‘Assembly of Migrant Hunger Strikers’ (AMHS).  
 
Our face-to-face interviews, held in Crete in July 2012, allow us to have a closer look at the 
profile and attitudes of the hunger strikers. By the time of the survey, 100-120 of the 287 
participants had permanently left Greece and a further 40-50 were on holiday. About 20 
individuals refused the invitation to participate. In total, 52 interviews were conducted, each 
lasting approximately 30 minutes, using an original structured questionnaire, which 
included both open and closed questions. The research was funded by the Carnegie Trust, 
whose support is gratefully acknowledged, and carried out in accordance with the standard 
code of practice for research including human beings; no individuals can be identified from 
the data collected. 
 
All of our respondents were nationals of Maghreb countries, 48 from Morocco, 2 from 
Algeria and 2 from Tunisia. Most were in their mid-to- late 20s and single (92%). In terms of 
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their employment status, 40% were working full-time, 37% part-time, and 19% were 
unemployed – nationwide unemployment in Greece at the time of the survey was about 
25%. The majority of migrants found employment opportunities in the construction sector, 
as well as in the tourist industry and agriculture. As was also the case with citizens, the 
impact of the economic downturn had been uniformly detrimental to their living conditions, 
with 90% noting that their life was worse (62% much worse) compared to before the crisis. 
The reduction of employment opportunities was cited as the main problem by almost all 
respondents, closely followed by the increase of racism and the prevalence of anti-
immigration discourses. 
 
Criminalisation and securitisation of migration, inevitably, increase migrant insecurity. 
Almost one in two (46%) of our respondents reported that they had been a victim of some 
form of abuse, either verbal (21%), physical (15%) or both (10%). The frequency of abuse 
varied: for some migrants it occurred once (10%), for others 2-5 times (25%), with 11% 
reporting they had been abused more than 5 times. When asked to describe in an open-
ended question who they were abused by, the most common answers, by far, were ‘the 
police’ and ‘fascists’, presumably, a reference to supporters of the extreme right ‘Golden 
Dawn’ party, who have been linked to prosecution of migrants. Only a small minority 
referred to Greeks in general as the culprits of racist attacks, although some did note that 
they had expected people to be kinder. 
 
 
Figure 1: Levels of Satisfaction 
 
 
 
Own data, collected July 2012. Question wording: ‘How satisfied or dissatisfied would you say 
you are nowadays with...? (in %)’ 
 
 
We asked participants to express their level of satisfaction with various aspects of their 
lives that might have been affected by the criminalisation of migration (Figure 1). An 
overwhelming majority (90%) were, unsurprisingly, dissatisfied with the state’s illiberal 
immigration policy (81% very dissatisfied). Similarly, 89% of respondents were unhappy 
with their access to the labour market (77% very dissatisfied), an indication of both the 
impact of the economic crisis, as well as of criminalisation, considering the legal provisions 
of heavy penalties for employers who hire undocumented migrants.  
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Nevertheless, in other areas, the restrictive laws did not seem to be enforced and formal 
exclusion did not affect the migrants’ daily lives. For instance, respondents were satisfied 
with their access to the housing market (80%), public transportation (77%) and healthcare 
(50%), despite the threat of penalties to citizens who provided these services to irregular 
migrants. Furthermore, a minority (38%) expressed dissatisfaction with how they were 
treated by citizens in general, which is perhaps lower than we might have expected, given 
the aforementioned high abuse rates and the increased public exposure that activism 
entails. When these are read in conjunction with other studies that find that citizens often 
develop friendship ties with migrants (Kasimis, Papadopoulos &  Zacopoulou 2003), it 
suggests that criminalisation does not result in a total exclusion from access to certain 
rights and services, as ‘nonstatus migrants experience different degrees and forms of 
exclusion in their daily lives’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2011: 203). 
 
When asked to evaluate the involvement of a range of actors, specifically with regards to 
their hunger strike, our interviewees were very positive about the solidarity groups, strike 
organisers and immigrant associations but were very critical of the way the government and 
the police managed the issue (results plotted in Figure 2). With the government refusing to 
negotiate until the health of many of the strikers reached critical levels, a deal was finally 
brokered on 9 March 2011 to end the protest, whose escalation was damaging the 
government’s reputation and legitimacy  (Dingley & Mollica, 2007). The migrants’ demand 
for full regularisation was rejected but some moderate ad hoc concessions were made, 
including being granted a biannually renewable status of ‘indefinite tolerance’ and given 
special permission to visit their home countries. For most these were not enough. On a 0-
10 scale, where 0 means ‘not at all’, and 10 means ‘absolutely’, the mean average of 
respondents’ who retrospectively believed that the goals of the hunger strike were achieved 
was just 3.1, although on a personal level they felt that participation helped them grow as 
individuals and was something to be proud of. 
 
 
Figure 2: Evaluations of Key Actors Involved in the Hunger Strike 
 
 
 
Own data, collected July 2012. Question wording: ‘How positive or negative would you say the 
involvement of each of the following actors was in the strike action? (in %)’ 
 
 
Our data also allows us to see a snapshot of migration pathways and evaluate the 
participants’ overall migrant experience in Greece. The majority of respondents, 73%, had 
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been residing in Greece for more than 5 years. Only a small percentage, 9%, came to 
Greece regularly with a student or tourist visa. The remaining 91% entered the country 
irregularly via Turkey, through Samos (33%), Patmos (20%), other islands (18%) or the 
land borders in Northern Greece (21%). Figure 3 plots responses about the drivers of their 
decision to emigrate. The most important motivation was to use Greece as a transit 
destination to another EU state (69%). Pursuit of better living conditions (64%) and 
employment (62%) were also important drivers but fear of prosecution in their home 
countries was not (8%). Findings also debunk some of the myths about other pull factors, 
such as presumed knowledge of welfare provisions and presence of existing migrant 
communities, which do not apply in this case. Overall, 40% expressed a desire to settle 
permanently in Greece, despite criminalisation, with the rest seeking to move elsewhere in 
the EU or return to their home country. 
 
 
Figure 3: Push and Pull Factors of Migration 
 
 
 
Own data, collected July 2012. Question wording: ‘To what extent did any of the following 
influence your decision to come to Greece (in %)?’ 
 
 
 
Framing the Protest Movement 
 
In addition to the performative act of the hunger strike, the migrant protesters sought to 
make an impact on debates relevant to the criminalisation of migration through fifteen press 
statements. Discourse analysis is employed in this section to explore their collective 
framing of the protest action. The Assembly’s first public statement on 23 January 2011 
introduced the protesters to the public as ‘migrant men and women, refugees from all over 
Greece […] [who] came here to escape poverty, unemployment, wars and dictatorships’ 
(AMHS, 2011a). Our individual level survey data above challenge the accuracy of this 
statement. All protesters were in fact male, residing in Crete, exclusively from Maghreb 
countries, while very few had been persecuted in their home countries. However, adopting 
an all-encompassing and open identity was designed to maximise its potential to mobilise 
support from the over one million migrants across Greece, in the name of whom the hunger 
strike was conducted (Jasper, 2004). 
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Accordingly, the protesters underlined that the main aim of their collective action, as 
framed, was the regularisation of all undocumented migrants in Greece (AMHS, 2011a), to 
dispel any suggestions that they were driven by either individualistic motives or any 
underlying psychological conditions (Silove, Steel & Waters, 2000; McGregor, 2011). In this 
respect, they specifically highlighted that: ‘[W]e are not mentally disordered. We started a 
fight through our own conscious processes. Our morale is very high and we don’t need any 
kind of psychological support’ (AMHS, 2011b). 
 
The protesters repeatedly and emphatically stated that they were fully conscious of the 
risks they were taking: ‘[w]e risk our lives because, either way, there is no dignity in our 
living conditions (…)’ and ‘[w]e would rather die here than allow our children to suffer what 
we have been through’ (AMHS, 2011a). They expressed certainty that their struggle was a 
just one and a source of commitment, self-legitimacy and pride: ‘[we will] exit this building 
either as winners or dead’ (Dama, 2011). Thus, they portrayed their hunger strike as their 
last resort to pressure the government to address their grievances, deriving from the 
criminalisation of migration: ‘[w]e do not have any other way to make our voices heard, to 
raise awareness of our rights’ (AMHS, 2011a). 
 
The protesters also strategically framed their collective identity as being first and foremost 
workers, irrespective of their ethnicity or legal status, by underlining that their struggle 
seeks to ‘send a message to every Greek and foreign worker to rise up […] This strike 
belongs to all of us’ (AMHS, 2011c). Their irregular status was not hidden but attention was 
shifted away from it: ‘[w]hether by regular or irregular entry, we came to Greece and are 
working to support ourselves and our families. We live without dignity, in the dark shadow 
of illegality’ (AMHS, 2011a). By constructing an image of themselves as suffering workers, 
who did their best to provide for their families, they tried to humanise their struggle and 
generate empathy among Greek citizens, who were experiencing relatable economic 
hardship at the time. After all, key to securitisation is the construction of adversarial 
identities (‘us’ versus ‘them’), which the protesters sought to re-imagine as not being based 
on ethnic/citizenship grounds but on economic/class ones. 
 
Related to this, both the hunger strike as a form of protest (Simeant, 1998) and its framing 
as a labour movement were designed to appeal to left-wing audiences in particular. The 
protesters finger-pointed ‘the West’, the ‘multinational companies and their political 
servants’ for the economic crisis, echoing the discourse of left-wing parties (AMHS, 2011a). 
They rejected the scapegoating of migrants, emphasising instead that their vulnerable 
position as irregular migrants enables employers and state agencies to benefit from the 
‘harsh exploitation’ of their labour. However, they highlighted the fact that this applies to 
migrants and citizens alike and thus made a plea to ‘our Greek fellow workers, everyone 
suffering exploitation, to stand with us’ (ibid). 
 
Despite the role of various social networks in the organisation of the protest, the hunger 
strikers defended the independence of their actions, rejecting allegations that they were 
pawns in a bigger political game: ‘[w]e take our decisions by ourselves during the 
assemblies we hold, and we do not get influenced by external factors’ (AMHS, 2011d). 
Reiterating, they insisted that ‘[w]e, 300, took the initiative for that kind of struggle, without 
the intervention of political parties, organisations and individuals’ (AMHS, 2011e). Finally, 
they underlined that they were not victims and they should not be portrayed as such: ‘[w]e 
are not those piteous, destitute migrants, deprived of housing, work and clothes that the 
media are describing’. Instead, they portrayed themselves as active political agents who 
‘came to fight, for as long as our bodies will allow us, for our rights and for a life with dignity’ 
(AMHS, 2011d).  
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Conclusion 
 
The paper analysed both the top-down process and the impact of 
criminalisation/securitisation on migrants’ lives. It demonstrates that prevalence of 
restrictive frames and policies in Greece to manage migration is very detrimental for its 
subjects, the migrants themselves, who experience increased levels of insecurity, abuse 
and deprivation. While an accurate assessment of this would require the comparison of our 
findings with a sample of the migrant population who did not participate in protest action, 
our data give a good indication of how migrants experience criminalisation. What is 
somewhat comforting is that, even in such hostile conditions, there appears to be a degree 
of solidarity that exists within society. As our analysis demonstrates, migrants experience 
different degrees and forms of exclusion, which is lower than the legal framework 
prescribes in relation to certain rights and services, such as housing and healthcare. 
 
The other key take-away from the Greek case is the demonstrable desire and ability of 
irregular migrants to escape invisibility, even temporarily, and popularise their grievances. 
What is important in this area is that the discourses of the protesters did not only result 
from the daily experiences of the actors within mobilisations, as Della Porta & Piazza 
(2008) claim. Instead, the framing of the hunger strike by the protesters was markedly 
strategic, seeking to make links with potential allies among both migrants and citizens to 
maximise the impact of their message. Admittedly, the protesters achieved less than they 
desired from the hunger strike. However, the alliances built, the socialisation experience 
gained and the visibility they received has planted a seed for a challenge to securitisation 
that is likely to find fertile ground to grow, once the economic conditions, mainly, and the 
political environment improves.  
 
It is worth concluding by reminding ourselves that criminalisation of ‘the other’ is not a new 
phenomenon in human history and it both can and should be resisted. The 1847 Annual 
Report of the American Institute (1848) of the city of New York eloquently captures this 
sentiment:  
 
The tide of emigration which now sets so strongly toward our shores, cannot be turned 
back. We must receive the poor, the ignorant, and the oppressed from other lands, and 
it would be better to consider them as coming filled with the energy of hope for happier 
days, and more useful labors, than they found at home. No one, I presume, seriously 
believes they come with bad intentions, and then whose fault is it that they live here in 
cellars more filthy than the cabins of whose wretchedness we hear so much, and for 
whose existence, half the blame is thrown upon the government they have left. Let us 
first cast the beam from our own eye. We are parties to their degradation, inasmuch as 
we permit the habitation of places, from which it is not possible improvement in 
condition or habits can come. We suffer the sub-landlord to stow them, like cattle, in 
pens, and to compel them to swallow poison with every breath. They are allowed, may 
it not be said required, to live in dirt, when the reverse, rather, should be enforced. 
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